Institutional reforms in the brazilian Ministry of defense (2007-2011) and the principal-agent framework by Medeiros Passos, Anais
Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Política, vol. 6, n. 2, 2015.  ISSN 2236-451X 
 
 
69 
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN THE BRAZILIAN MINISTRY OF 
DEFENSE (2007-2011) AND THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT FRAMEWORK 1 
 
Anaís Medeiros Passos 2 
 
Abstract 
This study analyses the institutional reforms that took place inside the Brazilian Ministry of Defense 
between 2007 and 2011. By stressing the strategic interaction between civilian and military members, 
we shed light on recent advances in institutionalizing civilian control. More precisely, measures such 
as creating a joint staff of the armed forces, changing the rules on military budget proposal and on 
promotion of military officers, connecting ministerial secretaries and helping to consolidate a civilian 
staff at the Ministry of Defense. These initiatives have reversed a historical pattern. That is, a high 
degree of autonomy of each service branch’ commanders vis-à-vis the Minister. As a conclusion, we 
say that the adoption of monitoring and intrusive mechanisms reveals the logic of delegation and 
division of labor, thus indicating a higher degree of professionalization among the Brazilian armed 
forces. 
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Resumo 
O estudo analisa as reformas institucionais que ocorreram no Ministério da Defesa entre 2007 e 2011.  
Salientando a relação estratégica entre civis e militares, enfatiza-se os recentes avanços da 
institucionalização de controle civil. Especificamente, medidas como a criação de um Estado-Maior 
Conjunto das Forças Armadas, mudanças das regras para a proposição orçamentária de cada Serviço 
e para a promoção de oficiais-generais, integração das secretarias ministeriais e incentivo à 
consolidação de um staff civil no Ministério da Defesa. Essas iniciativas reverteram um padrão 
histórico, ou seja, um alto grau de autonomia dos comandantes das Forças Armadas em relação ao 
Ministro. Em conclusão, a adoção de mecanismos de monitoramento intrusivos revela uma lógica de 
delegação e divisão do trabalho, indicando uma maior profissionalização das Forças Armadas 
brasileiras. 
Palavras-chave: Ministério da Defesa, controle civil, delegação, democracia.  
 
Resumen 
El trabajo analiza las reformas institucionales ocurridas en el Ministerio de la Defensa desde 2007 
hasta 2011. Se enfoca en la relación estratégica entre civiles y militares, poniendo enfásis en los 
recientes avances de institucionalización del control civil. Más especificamente, estudia iniciativas 
como la creación de un Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas, los cambios en las reglas 
para proponer el presupuesto militar y para promocionar oficiales militares, la integración entre las 
secretarias ministeriales, y los incentivos para las creación de un staff civil en el Ministerio de la 
Defensa. Esas iniciativas han revertido un padrón histórico, es decir, un alto grado de autonomía de 
los comandantes en relación al Ministro. En conclusión, la incorporación de mecanismos de control 
instrusivos demuestra una lógica de division de trabajo y delegación de funciones, indicando un mayor 
grado de profesionalización de las Fuerzas Armadas brasileñas. 
Palabras-clave: Ministerio de la Defensa, control civil, delegación, democracia. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the key issues addressed by contemporary literature on civil-military relations 
is the interaction between civilian authorities, military members and society in a democratic 
regime. Also, a central theme has been the one of how much political influence military 
members enjoy in contemporary democracies. Stepan (1988) has emphasized that Latin 
American militaries in general maintained control during the democratization process and 
gained political advantage from the newly formed democratic forces, which allowed them to  
insulate themselves from civilian control. The author recognizes these prerogatives as a latent 
example of independent structural power within the polity that could vary from a low, 
moderate or high presence3. In this sense, Zaverucha (1994; 2005) classifies Brazil after 1988 
as a semi-democracy entailing a friendly military tutelage. Although they do not aim to be at 
the Executive Power, the military continue to enjoy veto powers in moments of political 
crisis4.  
By contrast Hunter (1997a; 1997b) says that, although the initial conditions favored 
the continuity of certain institutional privileges of the armed forces, electoral competition in 
post-authoritarian Brazil led civilians to contest the military and effectively reduce military 
capacity to interfere in the political agenda in the medium and long terms, therefore altering 
the conservative pact that prevailed during transition. Oliveira (1994, p. 249) identifies a crisis 
of identity among armed forces members since 1988 and the end of the Cold War. This crisis 
starts with the beginning of re-democratization during Geisel’s term (1974-1979) and 
increases during Collor’s government (1990-1992), signalizing an increasingly less powerful 
and influential military.  
These explanations, far from being incompatible, shed light on different aspects of 
contemporary relations in re-democratized countries during the last decades. Fitch has 
considered there to be three basic patterns of civil-military relations that should be attended 
in democracies ( 1998, p.37–38). First, military members  are politically subordinated to the 
democratic regime, meaning that the notion of “national guardians of the nation” 
(LOVEMAN, 1999) is inconsistent with democratic values. The armed forces do not act as 
moderators of political activity in order to preserve the status quo. But they can be politically 
                                                          
3 For a contemporary analysis of these prerogatives in Brazil see BRUNEAU, T.C. & D.TOLLEFSON, S., 
2014. Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: A Reassessment. Journal of Politics in Latin America, 6 (2),pp.107-138. 
4 For example, the congressmen Ricardo Fiúza represented the military lobby. He was the president of the 
Subcommittee on the Defense of State, Society and Security during the constitution-drafting Congress of 1988. 
He was able to veto the creation of a Ministry of Defense at the time because this institution was seen by the 
military ministers as a threat to their autonomy and prestige. 
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subordinated and still have their own corporative interests. Secondly, there is policy control 
over the armed forces via constitutionally elected civilian authorities, which means that 
missions and budgetary resources should not be considered exclusive areas of military 
domain. These assignments should be made by the competent civilian authority and military 
forces will have autonomy for deciding just when explicitly delegated. Lastly, military 
members act according to the law, thus they should not violate the rights of other groups or 
individuals. Even though they can be subjected to special legal norms, the armed forces are 
not conceded legal privileges by law or by legislative practices. 
The existing situation does not permit us to posit that Brazil has reached a 
consolidated democratic control5, since constitutional military prerogatives and the informal 
power enjoyed by military forces are still important, despite the fact that this is declining 
(ARTURI, 2011, p. 168).6 But on a day-to-day level, we take as an assumption that disputes 
between civilian authorities and military forces happen within democratic channels, even in 
situations where military interests are negatively affected. That is why a theoretical framework 
that emphasizes such strategic interaction can be helpful in understanding recent advances 
on institutionalizing civilian control over the armed forces.  
The assumption introduced by Huntington (1957) that objective civilian control 
would maximize military professionalism and at the same time  ensure their subordination 
to civilian authorities is a concept which has been quite contested. For Huntington, a 
professional military would be by definition politically neutral and should have autonomy on 
corporative issues, while the most critical ones related to domestic and foreign policy would 
be of civilian competency (1957, p. 80-84) . By “militarizing the military” and allowing the 
armed forces to act more freely within their own professional domain, Huntington insists, it 
would be possible to have a subordinated and efficient military establishment.  
                                                          
5 The concept of democratic civilian control is an oft-cited one. Basically, assessing democratic civilian control 
involves a multidimensional task entailing legal, social and political aspects. Érica Winand and Héctor Luis 
Saint-Pierre (2007) say that it depends on consolidating relations of power inside the State that cope with a 
normative pattern of subordination to the democratically elected authorities, thus excluding the armed forces 
from national politics.  
6 In this sense, (D’ARAÚJO, 2008), although recognizing the institutionalization of civilian control over defense 
policy, alerts to the fact that the military still receives a different legal treatment, since military members can 
only be judged by the Military Court. Additionally, (ZAVERUCHA; REZENDE, 2009) demonstrate that 
during Fernando Henrique Cardoso’ and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva terms’ (1995-2006) the Ministry of Defense 
represented the third largest budget, only behind the Ministries of Social Security and Health. This would reflect 
the success of military groups in defending their corporative interests, in exchange for support to internal 
security tasks.   
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Different analyses have shown that, in Latin American, higher levels of 
professionalization have, in fact, coincided with increased political activity among military 
officers (FITCH, 1998; LOVEMAN, 1999). During the decades of 1920 and 1930, several 
foreign missions from Germany, Italy and Spain came to the region to provide armed forces 
with professional training. These missions also provided the rationale of moral superiority 
that made military officers to see civilian authorities as rather handicapped in solving national 
problems. In the following decades, such rhetoric would lead the armed forces to assume 
leadership and dominate internal administration (LOVEMAN 1999, p. 65–70). 
After the third wave of democratization, the military retreated from national politics 
in most countries in the region, which went alongside the elite’s desire (that had previously 
supported the regime) to distance themselves from this past. In many countries, the armed 
forces faced a crisis of legitimacy that was followed by cuts on the budget and size of the 
troops. Additionally, the widespread concern for keeping the armed forces restricted to their 
own professional sphere revived the worry for professionalization. 
If the armed forces have been used since then in new missions, such as combatting 
the drug trafficking and organized crime in Brazil and Mexico, this has been done following 
civilian orders and does not seem, in the first case, to be capable of substantially altering 
civilian control towards a military tutelage. At the same time, if we take the example of the 
GLO operation at Complexo da Maré, in the state of Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), that started in 
March 2014 and ended in June 2015, it seems too optimistic to claim that these operations 
happened completely according to democratic parameters. There are still significant vacuums 
of power during these operations, mostly created by civilian inability and lack of expertise in 
dealing with midlevel threats7. Inadequate police training and a lack of knowledge in 
intelligence-gathering lead civilian authorities to leave important decisions in the hands of 
military officers. Such undesirable combination allows them to act autonomously and 
commit several human right abuses, thus jeopardizing the confidence the populations 
affected have in democratic institutions and also in the armed forces. This clearly does not 
fit into the third aspect laid out by Samuel Fitch, which insists that military members should 
not violate the rights of other groups or individuals. 
                                                          
7 (PION-BERLIN; TRINKUNAS, 2011) define midlevel threats as the ones posed by non-state actors that act 
across boundaries, softened by globalization. These groups are able to produce violence at higher levels 
comparing to common crimes, including drug trafficking groups and youth gangs.  
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A single theoretical approach (rational-choice or historical-institutionalism, for 
instance) proved to be insufficient to address the state of civil-military relations in 
contemporary democracies, especially where cooperative and conflictive efforts are 
simultaneously present. The principal-agent framework, by analyzing how these impulses 
happen on a day-to-day basis can help us to understand this new scenario at the institutional 
level8. We will analyze a positive case, the Ministry of Defense, which is a central institution 
for emulating civilian hierarchy inside defense institutions. 
  
2. THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT FRAMEWORK 
Feaver (2003) adapts an economic theory, the formal-agency theory, to address 
civilian oversight in mature democracies9. Although we are aware of the several obstacles in 
achieving and institutionalizing civilian control over the military, this theoretical framework 
can be useful in understanding the institutional reforms inside the Brazilian Ministry of 
Defense, from 2007 to 2011. The principal-agent framework intends to analyze problems of 
agency, a situation where one person (the principal) delegates authority to someone else (the 
agent) and wants to ensure that his/her objectives will be carried out. It’s precisely because 
delegation does not mean giving away your responsibility (KIEWIET; MCCUBBINS, 1991) 
that monitoring mechanisms with the lowest costs (in order to not compromise efficiency) 
are necessary. 
 In a democratic regime, relations between civilians and the military are strategic, since 
choices are both dependent on expectations concerning the other’ behavior. Civil-military 
relations are also hierarchical, because democratically elected civilians are considered to be 
politically superior to make decisions. Additionally, Peter Feaver posits that civilian and 
military present distinct moral qualities and political competencies: “The military officer is 
promising to risk his life, or to order his comrades to risk their lives, to execute any policy 
decisions. The civilian actor is promising to answer to the electorate for the consequences of 
any policy decisions.” (2003, p. 09).  
 Although civilians and military may share the same goal (to supply security for the 
state and citizens) they may disagree on how to achieve it, in both general and specific terms. 
                                                          
8 I stress this aspect because the principal-agent framework does not offer a satisfactory explanation to civil-
military relations at the grassroot level, where low-ranking military officers and ordinary citizens interact. I am 
exploring this point in my ongoing Phd research.  
9 A category comprising countries where there’s a general consolidated supremacy over the military. 
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Also, following from this argument, information asymmetries have profound effects on civil-
military relations. The military’s status as experts on the management of violence gives them 
expressive informational advantages over civilians in tactics and logics, which tends to 
increase as the operations get closer to combat. This can be exacerbated due to the absence 
of civilian experts on defense issues in Brazil. At a lower degree, some information is private 
only to civilians, since they are the decision-makers in a democracy. Civilians may give orders 
to military officers, but may not always reveal all the issues that are at stake. For example, the 
President might implement a policy or measure as part of an effort to increase his/her 
popularity, but he/she will not present the proposal as such.  
 Additionally, civilians pursue multidimensional goals, which means that assessing 
whether or not militaries are following their command (if they’re working or not) involves a 
more complex reasoning. Peter Feaver identifies two kinds of goals, functional and relational, 
that can be further disaggregated into specific tasks (2003, p.61). Functional goals comprise 
verifying whether the military is doing what civilians asked them to do (that is, if they are 
following civilian orders), if the military is working at its best to accomplish such task and if 
the military is competent enough to do what civilians required. Identifying when the military 
is not working can be easier in these situations. By contrast, relational goals entail defining 
which decision civilians are going to delegate to the military and can appear more complex 
to assess (FEAVER, 2003, p.61). Relational goals include assessing if civilians make key 
policy decisions, substantive in nature. If civilians choose which decisions should be made 
by civilians or which should be left to the military and, at a more general level, if any military 
action is being done which erodes civilian supremacy in the long term.  
 On the other hand, military agents also have different kinds of preferences that can 
fit into three specific sets: policy outcomes, how their behavior is interpreted and how the 
relationship is monitored (FEAVER, 2003, p. 63-64). Military agents have military policy 
preferences, such as preferring to deal with offensive or even preventive operations that 
enable them to be in a position of advantage, where the scope of the conflict can be 
controlled.   
          Also Peter Feaver identifies a general military preference for honor and respect that 
may give an incentive for military members to obey civilian orders. In this sense,  studies on 
police officers have previously stated that organizational culture has an overwhelming 
importance in determining higher degrees of compliance among the subordinates (BREHM; 
GATES, 1993). Since not following civilian command is seen as dishonorable in a 
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democracy, military members may choose to act accordingly because it is the “right thing to 
do”.  Lastly, a minimum degree of civilian intrusion and supervision will always be preferred 
by the military. This is according to the traditional organization theory, that says that an agent 
always values autonomy, meaning “the ability to decide what to do” and “the ability to decide 
how to do it” (FEAVER, 2003, p. 64)  
The mutual influence of information problems and divergent preferences generate 
two challenges: adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection refers to the fact that 
the principal cannot be absolutely certain about the true preferences and skills of the agent, 
while moral hazard means that principals cannot always be present to observe the agent, so 
he/she can never be sure if the agent is following the orders or not. Briefly, Peter Feaver 
summarizes this point: “How do we know that the military is doing what it is supposed to 
be doing? How do we know that the military is serving the interests of the country and not 
parochial interests (…)?” (FEAVER, 2003, p.75). These factors may increase agency losses, 
situations in which there is a conflict between the interests of those who delegate authority 
and the agent (KIEWIET; MCCUBBINS, 1991).  
Monitoring mechanisms are tools for dealing with this problem of information: to 
know what the agent is doing even though the principal cannot always be there to watch. 
These mechanisms can be adjusted so that they are the least possibly intrusive or up until 
being a most intrusive way form of monitoring the military. Agents will behave depending 
on their expectations of punishment if they don't work or, more broadly speaking, simply 
according to their own preferences. Peter Feaver argues that the assumption of automatic 
punishment in case agents misbehave should be loosened when we are studying civilian and 
military authorities, since the issues at stake are more intricate. It does not seem realistic that 
civilians will systematically review the question of delegation each time a problem emerges 
(FEAVER, 2003, p. 58). Bureaucratic inertia plays a role here, since costs of change are 
significant and tend to increase over time. Additionally, multidimensional preferences are at 
stake, so it is not a simple question of yes or no concerning whether to work or not. 
Delegation depends on the trust in the military, according to Peter Feaver, but we 
should have in mind that in Latin America there’s a general trend of over-delegation due, in 
part, to an absence of civilian expertise on defense matters and also due to historical patterns 
of high levels of autonomy given to the military institution. In a democracy, the assignment 
of a military mission should be initiated, managed and terminated by democratically elected 
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leaders (PION-BERLIN, D.; ARCENEAUX, 2000), since civilians are the ones  responsible 
for making political decisions. But in Latin America, the authors argue, the problem rests in 
the area of managing once the operation has started, since commonly civilians, due to the 
lack of expertise in counter-narcotic and counter-insurgency operations, “adopt a laissez-
faire approach, refusing to make the kind of critical means-ends judgments necessary to keep 
the operation within permissible bounds.” (PION-BERLIN, D; ARCENEAUX, 2000, p. 
421). As a result, key decisions are often left to military commanders.  
Returning to Peter Feaver framework, he says that monitoring can be done by simply 
limiting the scope of delegation to the military, leaving a greater amount of decisions and 
tasks to civilians. This can be achieved through rules of engagement, mission orders and 
contingency-plans. From elaborating strategy, defining operations, conceiving specific tactics 
and providing logistics and equipment, these are all tasks that should not necessarily be 
assigned to militaries.  
A second form of monitoring, though more intrusive, is to introduce screening and 
selection mechanisms, meaning to inculcate civilian preferences among military members, 
decreasing the divergence between principal’s preferences and agent’s ones. Educational 
system and skill tests are means of selecting individuals fitting a certain pattern before an 
actual contractual relationship is formalized. Also, it includes accession policy in the armed 
forces and rules on officer promotions.  Peter Feaver posits that civilian influence and 
screening over officer corps can help to increase the degree of confidence between the 
officers appointed and civilian authorities (2003, p. 79). 
The next more intrusive mechanism of monitoring is the use of the so-called “fire 
alarms”, here third parties, such as the news media, think tanks and universities to oversee 
and report on key policy outcomes. “Fire alarms” have been previously defined by the 
literature as the observation by third parties that are affected by the agents’ actions 
(KIEWIET, MCCUBBINS, 1991, p. 32–33). This mechanism may be less costly and more 
reliable than the information collected by “police patrols”. Indeed, under a well-coordinated 
system of fire-alarms, violations on the agents’ conduct may be well scrutinized.  
A fourth mechanism is the institutional checks that are directly empowered by the 
civilian principal to monitor other agents, having as primary mission to inform if there are 
any irregularities going on that disrespect the contractual mission (FEAVER, 2003, p. 81). 
In this category we can include the Congress civilian staff that are responsible for monitoring 
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defense issues or budgets, a confirmable civilian secretariat and inter-service competition. 
Institutional checks require that other agencies have the authority to block or to veto the 
actions of the agent; otherwise, they will be useless. Although institutional checks may 
increase the security of overcoming agency losses, they also may reduce flexibility in decision-
making process (KIEWIET, MCCUBBINS, 1991, p. 24). 
Lastly, we have the police patrols that are even more intrusive forms of surveilling 
the agent. They involve systematic investigations on what and how the agent is performing 
a task. These direct forms of monitoring cost the principal time and effort, since constant 
and invasive supervision may be corrosive to the morale of both the principal and agent 
(KIEWIET; MCCUBBINS, 1991, p. 32). That is why police patrols should be used with 
moderation. According to Peter Feaver, civil-military analogs include at the executive’s level 
a Civilian Secretariat and Office of Secretary of Defense, rules on the budget process 
(planning, programming and budgeting), restrictive rules of engagements, restrictive standing 
or mission orders and limits on delegated authority (FEAVER, 2003, p. 84-85). At the judicial 
level, police patrols comprise audits and investigations. Lastly, at the legislative level, 
institutions such as the Congressional Budget Office, the General Accounting Office and the 
Office of Technical Assessment supervise the military behavior. 
Peter Feaver also lays out punishment mechanisms available is case military agents 
do not follow the principal orders, a subject that according to him also has not been well 
covered by civil-military relations theory (2003, p.89). Such actions can actually reinforce 
discipline and facilitate civilian control. At a first level, they include imposing intrusive forms 
of monitoring, those which may displease military agents (who notably enjoy autonomy), 
such as audits and mandatory remedial training in case of misbehavior. Civilians can also 
offer material disincentives such as cutting down budgets and limiting benefits (like 
postponing military promotions that need to be approved by the Congress). The third set of 
mechanisms includes imposing measures that will have a negative material impact on the 
future, what notably entails variation on forced detachment from the military or retiring an 
officer at a lower rank than they achieved. The fourth set of punishment includes the military 
justice system that can punish and imprison military members, in order to maintain the 
discipline within the military. Lastly, there are extra-legal civilian actions like public 
reprimands against a specific military officer. We will now analyze the institutional reforms 
at the Brazilian Ministry of Defense (2007-2011) in the light of the monitoring mechanisms 
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previously cited, a way of overcoming the problems that arise with delegation of power in a 
democracy. 
 
3. THE BRAZILIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY (2007-2011) 
The Ministry of Defense (MOD) is a key institution for consolidating democratic 
civilian control over the military (WINAND, SAINT-PIERRE, 2007; FUCILLE, 2006; 
BRUNEAU, 2001). Not only are legal, financial and human resources necessary for this 
control, but the Ministry of Defense also needs to be effectively part of the political system. 
In short: “The ideal situation, at least in a new democracy, is one in which the MOD as 
institution and minister as individual is integrated into the structure of power in the 
government and holds the personal confidence of the executive” (BRUNEAU, 2001, p. 24). 
Achieving and consolidating such patterns are a parallel but not automatic process after 
establishing this institution. The late creation of Brazilian’s Ministry of Defense in 1999 and, 
afterwards, the fragile power enjoyed by the civilian minister vis-à-vis the service branch’s 
commanders10 exemplifies the several obstacles to consolidate civilian control within the 
Ministry of Defense. 
In Brazil, several controversies became prominent after 1999, when the Ministers of 
the Navy, Air Force and Army were lowered to the status of service branch’s commanders. 
Elcio Álvares, the first Minister of Defense, remained in office for only seven months, from 
June 10th 1999 to  January 24th 2000, being forced to renounce after claims that his assistant 
Solange Resendes was involved with drug trafficking (OLIVEIRA, 2005, p. 120-121). Years 
later, the army published a document on October 17th 2004 with photos from the journalist 
Vladimir Herzog at the DOI-COI (Center for Internal Defense Operations), where he was 
tortured and murdered during the civil-military dictatorship (1964-1985) (FOLHA DE SÃO 
PAULO, 04/11/2004). The document also described the civil-military coup of 1964 in highly 
favorable terms. José Viegas Filho, who was in office from January 1st 2003 to   November 
8th 2004, sent a resignation letter. This happened despite the release of a second note written 
by general Francisco Roberto de Albuquerque, Army’s Commander, saying that the Army 
was sorry for the episode and such document did not express the institutions’ view 
(AGÊNCIA BRASIL, 19/10/2004). 
                                                          
10 Who retained several prerogatives such as control over the armed forces’ budget appropriation, hierarchical 
precedence over the joint staff and decision over military promotions. 
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In 2006, Waldir Pires took office in the middle of an aviation crisis, started after a 
plane crash between an executive jet plane and the Gol Airlines flight 1907 that killed 154 
people on September 29th 2006 (FOLHA DE SÃO PAULO, 01/10/2006). Another plane 
crash on July 17th 2007, this time killing 199 people who were on board the Tam flight, 
exposed the serious problems within the Ministry of Defense and its subordinate agency, the 
National Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC).  
Waldir Pires openly defended the demilitarization of the civil aviation system, which 
led to a conflict with the Air Force Commander, Luiz Carlos Bueno (OLIVEIRA, 2009, p. 
72). Besides the national aviation crisis, Oliveira says that the buying of weaponry, military 
ships and planes by Venezuela, stimulated a strategic partnership with Cuba, Ecuador, Bolivia 
and Nicaragua. This event pressed Brazil to reform its own defense sector, a condition for 
better projecting the country regionally. Waldir Pires was led to renounce to his office on 
July 15th 2007 and Nelson Jobim assumed the position of Minister of Defense, having as his 
immediate mission the reform of both the Ministry and the civil aviation system. 
Nelson Jobim’s nomination satisfied the military’s demand to be represented by an 
individual who was integrated into the government and had the confidence of the executive, 
but at the same time was ready to represent and defend military interests. Also we should 
take in account the perspective of creating a South-American Defense Council inside 
Unasur11, a proposal firmly defended by Brazil. The negotiations were led by the Ministers 
of Defense from the member countries. Consequently, it was necessary that such minister 
had in fact authority to support Brazil’s proposal.  
It is worth noting the use of symbolic strategies by Nelson Jobim which may have 
facilitated the introduction of these new rules inside the Ministry of Defense. He used 
military uniform while visiting quarters and frontier posts, hoping to get military support 
(REVISTA PIAUÍ, 2011). In this sense, Nelson Jobim’s term seems to confirm the tradition 
concerning the choice of Ministers of Defense in Latin American (PION-BERLIN, 2008) 
that whilst they might lack technical knowledge on defense issues, thanks to their political 
experience and the executive’s support, are capable of implementing changes. Nelson Jobim 
was able to be the official spokesman of military demands and simultaneously consolidate 
civilian control over them. 
                                                          
11 The creation of the South-American Defense Council was enacted on December 2008. 
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The Presidential Decree of September 6th 2007 (BRAZIL, 2007) established a 
Ministerial Committee to elaborate the National Strategy of Defense, headed by the Minister 
of Defense and coordinated by the Secretary of Strategic Affairs’ chief. Also present in this 
committee were the Ministers of Planning, Treasury, Science and Technology, as well as the 
Commanders of the Navy, Army and Air Force.  Two central premises guided the ministerial 
work (JOBIM, 2008, p. 02). First, that civilians and military members had different 
competencies, meaning that civilians were in charge of defining strategically in which 
situations military means should be employed, while the armed forces were responsible for 
assessing the probability of actually making use of these forces.  The logic of delegation and 
division of labor between civilians and the military is implicit in this reasoning. Tasks are 
entrusted to those that present a comparative advantage in accomplishing them (KIEWIET; 
MCCUBBINS, 1991, p. 37). Secondly, dissuasion remained the basilar principle of Brazilian 
defense policy, that should be oriented toward adapting the country to the new internal 
scenario. The Minister of Defense was seen as the coordinator of such necessary changes.  
During Nelson Jobim’s administration (2007-2011) we can identify two phases. On 
the first moment certain actions envisaged to reinforce the ministry’s authority and at the 
same time to restructure the aviation system12. After general Maynard Marques de Santa Rosa 
publicly expressed his disapproval towards the government’s human rights policies and the 
Truth Commission, he was discharged from his position (ESTADO DE S. PAULO, 
10/Fevereiro/2010). One year later, retired militaries made charges against Nelson Jobim, 
alleging that only military personnel could use the uniform. The Attorney General denied 
this legal action and pronounced that the Minister of Defense Nelson Jobim was the Armed 
Forces’ supreme commandant after the President (JOBIM, 2012). 
In both situations punishment mechanisms were employed to reinforce the discipline 
within the armed forces, since the relation between the military officers and civilian 
authorities had been negatively affected after the civilian aviation crisis begun. The first 
episode is clearly a variation of the third mechanism, a material disincentive impacting on a 
military career (an equivalent from dismissing an employee) while the second is not only a 
public purge (5th set) but also an example of legal action.   
After these punishment measures were taken, a second phase of Nelson Jobim’s 
administration began, where several institutional aspects were reformed.  A first step was to 
                                                          
12 Concerning this aspect, all ANAC and INFRAERO’ directive boards were discharged.  
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publish the National Defense Strategy (2008). This document was a considerable progress in 
comparison to the I National Defense Policy (Brazil, 1996) and the II National Defense 
Policy (Brazil, 2005), since it engaged civilians in discussing defense themes. Such policy 
document is organized around three axes: reorganization of the Armed Forces, the 
restructuring of the Brazilian defense industry, and the troop requirements policy for the 
Armed Forces. Going back to Peter Feaver’ arguments, this fits the functional goal of 
external protection pursued by civilians since such assessment can only be made based on an 
institutional document that sets the armed forces priorities and missions (FEAVER, 2003, 
p. 61). According to the principal-agent framework, civilian control over the military does 
not end with delegation and there are several operational control measures present in 
nonoperational contexts. By controlling the budget, military mission and doctrine, civilians 
can minimize the lack of civilian control once a military operation starts. In other words: 
“(…) the principal can know something about the likely activity of the agent, even without 
directly observing him (D. FEAVER, 2003, p. 75). 
This document was based on the assumption that four levels exist within the defense 
sector (JOBIM, 2012). At the first level, the National Defense Council, the Ministry of 
Defense and the President are responsible for handling with political decisions, thus defining 
general guidelines on policy defense. Next there is the strategic level, being part the Ministry 
of Defense, the service branch’s commanders and the armed forces joint staff. Lastly, the 
third and fourth levels, operational and technical, would be constituted by military members 
that are charged of operationalizing these strategic and political guideline previously defined 
for defense policy. Again, it appears the logic of delegation and division of labor, allowing 
governments to delegate tasks to the ones with more training and inclination to perform 
them (KIEWIET; MCCUBBINS, 1991). 
The first structuring axis includes unifying the armed forces operations by 
coordinating the three service branch commanders through a joint staff, headed by a top 
ranked officer and directly subordinated to the Ministry of Defense (ESTRATÉGIA 
NACIONAL DE DEFESA, 2008, p. 13). Also, another innovation is to centralize the 
purchasing of all defense products at the Ministry of Defense, under the responsibility of a 
secretariat of defense products. This measure intends to ensure that all acquisitions conform 
to the priorities laid out by the National Strategy of Defense. 
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Complimentary Law nº 97 issued on June 9th 1999  was replaced by Complimentary 
Law nº 136 issued on August 25th 2010. The former was elaborated simultaneously to the 
creation of the Ministry of Defense and aimed to limit the Minister’s authority while 
reinforcing the autonomy of each Military Branch, whose Commanders where chosen by 
military officers and nominated by the President, thus politically insulating the Minister. Also 
each Military Branch had autonomy to elaborate their own budget proposal and the Minister 
had no civilian assessors, only military advisors. Such ministerial structure clearly hampered 
efforts to monitor key military activities, since it obstructed the creation of a civilian staff 
inside the Ministry of Defense. According to Feaver (2003), the latter constitutes a type of 
police patrol that supposes a degree of intrusive surveilling since there’s a constant watch on 
the agent trough an institutional mechanism inside the Ministry.  
According to the Presidential Decree of January 17th 1980 on the Military War 
Structure, the President was the armed forces supreme commandant and there was no 
intermediate position between. Such disposition was only changed in 2010, when the 
Minister of Defense was integrated within the chain of command, as the intermediary 
between the armed forces and the President, responsible for logistic and political 
considerations inside the defense structure.  
Complimentary Law nº 136 transformed the armed forces general staff into the 
armed forces joint staff. The former did not have a clear scope of action, and thus frequently 
overlapped with other ministerial secretaries (ROSTY, 2011, p.11). The armed forces joint 
staff is now responsible for the joint employment of the armed forces, while the service 
branch’s commanders are responsible for the preparation (BRAZIL, 2010a, art 3º). 
Furthermore, this organ is responsible for permanently assisting the Ministry of Defense 
(BRAZIL, 2010c, art.º8) in a number of issues such as: national policy and strategy, 
participation and representation in Brazil and in foreign countries, logistics, mobilization, 
military technology and armed forces equipment.  
The chief of the armed forces joint staff is now positioned at the same hierarchical 
level as the military commanders (BRAZIL, 2010a, art 3º, §2), being indicated by the Minister 
of Defense and nominated by the President. Also the armed forces joint staff is now headed 
by a top ranked general, respecting military hierarchy. He should become a retired officer to 
occupy this post, ensuring he will only follow orders of the Minister of Defense. 
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Proposals for presidential nominations of each service branch’s commanders are now 
under the Minister’s responsibility (BRAZIL, 2010a, art. 4º) and each military commander 
has lost the prerogative to directly decide over military officers’ promotions. Now they 
should forward their proposals to the Minister of Defense, who may or may not approve 
them and forward them on for presidential nomination. (BRAZIL, 2010a, artº7). 
Additionally, the service branches should jointly prepare their budget proposal, following the 
priorities that were defined on the National Strategy of Defense (BRAZIL, 2010a, art 12, §2).  
Both the decisions concerning the chief of the armed forces joint staff and the 
military commanders can be interpreted in light of the principal-agent framework as ways of 
promoting a convergence between preferences of civilian principals and military agents, since 
they can be an instrument to reward military members that have a set of beliefs closer to 
civilians: “ (…) one way civilians can shape military behavior is to seek a convergence in 
views by promoting military agents who hold preferences more similar to those of civilian 
principals” (FEAVER, 2003, p. 59). But Peter Feaver posits that is not viable a total 
convergence since all military training is focused on developing a military identity that usually 
goes with criticizing civilian values and insulating the corporation from societal pressures. 
The Presidential Decree nº 7276 promulgated on October 25th 2010 (BRAZIL, 
2010b) approved the new military defense structure. Months later, another presidential 
decree, nº 7364 issued on November 23rd 2010 introduces changes on how secretaries of the 
Ministry of Defense are connected to the minister and the joint staff of the armed forces. 
Previously, those ministerial secretaries served to represent each military branch and the 
minister had no authority over them since their military personnel were directly subordinated 
to the military branch they belonged (JOBIM, 2012).  
Clearly, the new secretaries’ structure is more connected than the previous one, 
allowing the Minister of Defense to take decisions with autonomy from the service branch’s 
commander.  The Institutional Planning Advisory (Assessoria de Planejamento Institucional) 
(BRAZIL, 2010c, artº 4) is now responsible for drafting and reviewing the National Defense 
White Book; reviewing and developing the Minister of Defense’s strategic planning; assisting 
the Minister of Defense during decisional process of high complexity by developing 
knowledge on future scenarios, besides doing in partnership with other ministerial 
departments a continuous process of evaluation to meet the strategic planning goals. This is 
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an organ that works towards strategic planning and the gathering of information concerning 
all the activities developed inside the Ministry of Defense.  
The sections that were previously part of the Joint-State of Defense (Command and 
Control, Intelligence, Operations and Logistics) are now under the authority of the 
Preparation and Employment Command (Chefia de Preparo e Emprego) (BRAZIL, 2010c, art. 
9º), whose tasks include assisting the Joint Staff in preparing and employing the armed forces, 
elaborating and updating both the doctrine and the strategic planning for joint operations; 
planning and coordinating training for joint operations; following the employment of joint 
or singular operational commands; planning, coordinating and supervising the armed forces 
during peace missions and proposing guidelines for the armed forces in subsidiary activities.  
The previous Policy, Strategy and International Relations Secretary is now the 
Strategic Affairs Secretary. This Secretary also is subordinated to the joint staff of the armed 
forces. Its primary function is to assist the joint staff of the armed forces in policy, strategy, 
internal relations, intelligence and counter-intelligence issues, and also to propose and 
coordinate planning, implementation and supervising of related questions. (BRASIL 2010c, 
artº 4). Lastly, the Secretary of Education, Logistics, Mobilization, Science and Technology 
no longer exists. Questions related to national mobilization and logistics are now also 
subordinated to the joint staff of the armed forces trough the Logistics Command (BRASIL, 
2010c, art 5º). 
All these alterations were gathered in the National Defense White Book, (BRAZIL, 
2012a) and the Minister of Defense is responsible for their implementation. Such  document 
represents an important step towards more transparency in defense issues. On the other 
hand, these modifications also pose a challenge by creating an institutional demand for 
civilians with the necessary qualifications to work as defense experts. Otherwise military 
members will always remain as the sole experts on the management of violence. 
Lastly, law nº 12702 issued on August 2012 created a General Secretariat, conceived 
to be part of the Ministry of Defense as an organ of central direction. This development was 
consolidated trough the Presidential Decree nº 7974 promulgated on April 2013). All these 
measures clearly reinforced the ministerial authority inside the Ministry and eliminated 
several military prerogatives from the military commanders of each branch. According to the 
principal-agent framework, they are all monitoring and intrusive mechanisms that directly 
impact on the agents’ general preference for autonomy:  
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In the civil-military context, an important indicator of police patrol monitoring is 
the size of the civilian secretariat of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and 
the service secretariat. These are extensions of the executive branch principals, the 
patrol officers, who are in place to monitor closely and directly the activities of 
their military counterparts. Accordingly, large numbers of civilians officials are 
evidence of a police patrol monitoring mechanism (D. FEAVER,  2003, p. 84). 
 But since agent preferences are multidimensional we can at the same time reject 
preference “a” and contemplate preference “b”. If we consider that there was a general 
military disapproval towards all these measures, one should ask why there was not a military 
reaction. The alternative is not envisaged by the principal-agent framework since there is only 
two alternatives, according to Peter Feaver: working or not. Notwithstanding, the fact we are 
adapting this framework to understand Brazilian civil-military relations, a complex set of  
impulses of democratization and authoritarianism, leads to question why all these monitoring 
and intrusive mechanisms were accepted. According to Fitch (2001) a strong test for 
assessing civilian control is when civilians act against the will of the military forces. The 
acceptance of these policies can be a signal of political subordination to the democratically 
elected authorities. 
 We can also identify screening and selection monitoring mechanisms, following the 
Decree nº 6703 (18/December/2008) that approved the National Strategy of Defense and 
proposed a plan for transferring the Superior War School to Brasília until 20/06/2009. This 
change intended to create a professional institute to train new employees for the Ministry of 
Defense, instead of using public officials borrowed from other ministries, but until the 
moment this proposal was not implemented. This would be a way of improving how 
individuals are selected from entering into the military service.  
 By creating advisory secretaries inside the Minister of Defense and an armed forces 
joint staff, these institutional reforms pave the way for civilians to be placed in relevant 
positions (although it is not specified which is the proportion of civilians and military in those 
posts). As previously stated, the size of the civilian secretariat of the Ministry of Defense is 
an important indicator of a police patrol and thus may help such authority to make decisions 
without resorting to military agents. After the Senate approved  the project of complimentary 
law nº38 (PLC 38/2012), 225 office positions in ministerial commissions were created, 
alongside 263 posts of advisors that can be freely appointed or dismissed by the Minister of 
Defense. But until the present date, Brazil has a deficit of civilian experts. There is no 
perspective of permanence and promotion of civilians at the Minister because there is not a 
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civilian career on defense13. Additionally, the absence of an specialized and responsive 
bureaucracy on national defense limits the capacity of the Executive Power and parliamentary 
commission on strategic decisions (CEPIK, 2013).  
 We have identified several monitoring mechanisms in the institutional reforms 
promoted by Minister Nelson Jobim from 2007-2011. Such changes have clearly 
consolidated civilian control inside the Ministry. But there’s still a long way to go.  For 
example, the use of third parties, known as fire alarms, to supervise the agent and report 
when an agent misbehaves, is quite fragile in Brazil.  Transparency Law nº 12527 issued on 
November 18th 2011 improved the ease of access in regards to officials document from the 
Minster of Defense, including budget and the functionaries’ salary. Despite that, Brazilian 
news media remains somewhat distant from policy debates mostly, one could speculate, 
because defense issues do not generate interest among civil society.  
 Institutional checks on policy defense can be played out by the Congress. 
Complimentary Law nº 136/2010 was an advance since such legislation was discussed at the 
Chamber of Deputies. The National Strategy of Defense, that set the main directives of CL 
136, was created through a presidential directive and did not involve parliamentary 
discussion. Overall, in Brazil the Executive has been the most prominent in monitoring the 
armed forces.  
 Overall relations with the legislative power were not changed during Nelson Jobim’s 
term. The Foreign Relations and National Defense Commission (CREDN) receives the 
budgetary proposal, which is now consolidated and forwarded by the Ministry of Defense 
according to CL nº 136. From the Deputy’s Chamber, the proposal goes to the Senate, after 
this it is voted on by the National Congress and then comes back to the Executive, who is 
responsible for centralizing all resources expenses through the Ministry of Treasury. At the 
end, account reports are done by the Armed Forces, so the National Congress does not 
monitor military expenditures (SAINT-PIÉRRE; WINAND, 2007, p. 66).  Apparently, 
deputies do not worry about how to effectively monitor military expenditure because they 
do not think their interests are affected.  This seems to confirm what Hunter (1995) wrote 
two decades ago. According to her, democratic competitiveness incentives politicians to 
pursue programmatic and particularistic goals that will help them in being re-elected. 
                                                          
13 It is still running in the Federal Senate the proposal nº 10 for amending constitution (2011), allowing to create 
a career for civilian experts in defense called National Defense Analyst. Here’s the link for more information 
http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/materia/detalhes.asp?p_cod_mate=99465.  
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Supporting issues like health, public security and educations are more efficient forms of 
getting popular support. Since congressional oversight of expenditures has been emphasized 
by the literature (KIEWIET; MCCUBBINS, 1991) as crucial areas to monitor and control, 
this is certainly an important failure if one wishes to increase monitoring mechanisms over 
the armed forces.   
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This article has analyzed how institutional measures taken to reinforce the authority 
of the Minister of Defense were based on a comprehension that delegation does not mean 
renouncing to authority. By creating a joint staff of the armed forces, changing the rules on 
military budget proposal and on promotion of military officers, connecting ministerial 
secretaries and helping to consolidate a civilian staff at the Ministry of Defense, these 
initiatives have reversed a historical pattern. That is, a high degree of autonomy of each 
service branch’ commanders vis-à-vis the Minister. 
 Such measures can be classified conforming to the principal-agent framework as 
presenting different degrees of intrusiveness, from police patrol to rules on screening and 
selection. They also contribute to inculcate civilian values among military officers, thus 
helping to decrease the existing divergences between the principals’ and the agents’ 
preferences. However, there are still many obstacles to create a more connected network of 
fire alarms by third parties, whether it is the media news, think tanks or universities. The 
debate on defense issues is still restricted to a small group of experts and practitioners. 
Additionally, the National Congress has also been quite distant from such debates and a 
stronger participation would be positive for advancing civil-military relations in Brazil.  
 Specialization and division of labor are ideas that have been present in political 
discourse in the time of implementing these changes. These measures have reinforced the 
idea that militaries are not involved with politics. The fact that intrusive monitoring 
mechanisms have been implemented in the Ministry of Defense, an institution that 
historically had problems in facing military political pressures is relevant. It also represents a 
strong test for democracy since it involved measures that affected military interests.  
Maybe this could be the result of a gradual convergence between military and civilian 
preferences that now share a common understanding on how division of labor works in 
democracy. Also this can be a signal of a more professional military establishment, meaning 
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one that in a huntingtonian sense does not want to get involved with political issues. On both 
cases, further research is necessary to advance our understanding on contemporary patterns 
of civil-military relations in Brazil.   
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